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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-1753 
____________ 
 
DAVID PALMER, 
 
                                                                    Appellant 
v. 
 
SAMUEL NASSAN; TERRANCE DONNELLY; SHEILA LADNER 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-cv-00922) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 6, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, BARRY, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 07, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff David Palmer appeals the District Court‘s judgment following a jury trial 
on his claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm. 
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I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we 
recount only the essential facts and procedural history. 
A 
 As the jury found for Defendants—Samuel Nassan, Terrance Donnelly, and Sheila 
Ladner—we recite the facts in the light most favorable to them.  See Becker v. ARCO 
Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 After a night of drinking, Palmer was pulled over by Nassan, a Pennsylvania State 
Police Trooper, in Pittsburgh‘s South Side neighborhood.  Pittsburgh Police Officer 
Ladner was working with Nassan that night on the Pittsburgh DUI Task Force.  Nassan 
stopped Palmer because he observed Palmer‘s vehicle swerving erratically.  At the time 
of the stop, Palmer‘s blood-alcohol content was 0.098 percent. 
 The officers testified that Palmer appeared to be drunk: he reeked of alcohol, 
slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and at times was unresponsive to questioning.  
When asked by Nassan to exit the vehicle for a sobriety test, Palmer complied but became 
belligerent, and once out of the vehicle moved his hand toward his pocket.  Nassan 
ordered Palmer to stop reaching for his pocket, at which time Palmer disclosed that he 
had a gun.  Nassan then tried to subdue Palmer, assisted by Pittsburgh Police Sergeant 
Donnelly, who had arrived at the scene following the stop.  A struggle ensued.  After 
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Palmer kicked Ladner, she tased him in the buttocks.  Nassan also attempted to tase him, 
but his taser misfired.  Nassan then handcuffed Palmer, removed the weapon from 
Palmer‘s pocket, and brought him to a hospital for treatment of the injuries he sustained 
during the arrest. 
B 
 Palmer filed suit against Nassan, Donnelly, Ladner, and two municipal entities on 
both state and federal claims, but only the § 1983 excessive force claim against the 
individual Defendants reached trial.  Before trial, Nassan and Palmer filed motions in 
limine seeking, inter alia, a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence of unrelated 
incidents in which Nassan had been involved.  In particular, Palmer sought to introduce 
evidence of an arrest effectuated by Nassan approximately thirty minutes to one hour 
before Palmer was pulled over, and of three prior excessive force lawsuits against Nassan. 
 The District Court excluded evidence of those four incidents pursuant to Rules 403 and 
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for 
Defendants. 
II 
 We review the District Court‘s application of evidentiary rules for an abuse of 
discretion.  Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002).  ―An abuse 
of discretion occurs only where the district court‘s decision is ‗arbitrary, fanciful, or 
clearly unreasonable‘—in short, where ‗no reasonable person would adopt the district 
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court‘s view.‘‖  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 ―Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  
However, evidence of other acts ―may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.‖  Id.  A district court may exclude evidence, even if relevant and 
otherwise admissible, ―if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Rearranging these requirements, we have said that 
―[t]o be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) 
have a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be 
accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the 
jury may consider it.‖  Green, 617 F.3d at 249.  The first element of this test highlights 
that evidence proffered under Rule 404(b) may be asserted for either a proper or improper 
purpose.  Rule 404(b) ―generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts 
that might adversely reflect on the actor‘s character, unless that evidence bears upon a 
relevant issue‖ such as one of those enumerated in the second sentence of the rule.  
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). 
 Palmer lacks a permissible, relevant use of the purported Rule 404(b) evidence.  A 
claim of excessive force under § 1983 requires ―the jury . . . to determine whether [the 
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officer] used force that was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and facts 
confronting him at that time, without regard to his underlying motivation.‖  Mosley v. 
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1996).  Because the inquiry views the officer‘s actions 
objectively, his subjective intent or motivation is irrelevant.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 396–97 (1989); Mosley, 102 F.3d at 94–95.  Therefore, while Rule 404(b) might 
have permitted Palmer to introduce evidence of other acts to show Nassan‘s intent or 
motive, those factors were irrelevant to the proof of the claim and were properly 
excluded.  See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. 
 Palmer reaches into Rule 404(b)‘s grab bag for other permissible uses of other-acts 
evidence.  He contends that the prior incidents show Nassan‘s ―plan,‖ ―preparation,‖ or  
―opportunity.‖  To introduce other acts for these purposes, the proponent of the evidence 
must show that the prior acts are linked with the acts at issue, but there is no indication of 
any such link in the record here.  See Becker, 207 F.3d at 195–200 (requiring a common 
scheme to assert a ―plan‖).  In the same vein, Palmer offers little to assist us in 
―pinpoint[ing] the evidential fact‖ he seeks to prove by showing a plan, preparation, or 
opportunity.  Id. at 195.  Palmer‘s argument is simply that if Nassan had used excessive 
force on past occasions, he was more likely to have used it here.  But that argument 
asserts the evidence for ―exactly the purpose that Rule 404(b) declared to be 
improper, . . . namely, to establish the defendant[‘s] propensity to commit the charged 
act.‖  Id. at 201 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 For similar reasons, Palmer‘s contention that the arrest that took place shortly 
before the stop is not an ―other . . . act[]‖ because it was ―part of a continuous course of 
conduct by Nassan‖—and therefore that it does not fall within the purview of Rule 
404(b)—is unconvincing.  Palmer was not present during that arrest.  Nor were the arrests 
of such a similar character or close enough in time that they could be fairly characterized 
as ―intrinsic evidence‖ or ―res gestae‖ by which to judge whether Nassan‘s use of force 
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.  See Green, 617 F.3d at 239–49 
(discussing the history of intrinsic evidence as a carve out from Rule 404(b)).
1
  Even if 
the details of the other arrest were not inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Rule 402 would 
render them inadmissible for the reason discussed above.  Because the force used by an 
officer must be evaluated objectively, Nassan‘s state of mind and other actions leading up 
to his encounter with Palmer were not relevant to the question submitted to the jury. 
 Finally, as the introduction of evidence of other acts had the potential to prejudice 
Nassan and confuse the jury, it was not an abuse of the District Court‘s discretion to 
exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 403.
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1
 In Green, we held that ―evidence is intrinsic if it directly proves the charged 
offense‖ or if the other acts were ―performed contemporaneously with . . . [and] 
facilitate[d] the commission of‖ the act alleged.  617 F.3d at 248–49 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 
2
 In the District Court, Palmer sought the right to proffer evidence of Nassan‘s 
other acts to prove only the substance of his claims.  On appeal, he argues that the 
evidence is also admissible to challenge Nassan‘s credibility, which is relevant because at 
trial Palmer and Nassan gave different accounts of the events that transpired during the 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
stop and arrest.  Even if Palmer properly raised and preserved this issue by asserting the 
impeachment value of the evidence, which he apparently did not, he would not have been 
able to prove the other acts by extrinsic evidence.  Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).  Moreover, Rule 
608(b) gives the District Court discretion to determine whether those acts are ―probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness,‖ and the District Court would have been well within its 
discretion to exclude reference to Nassan‘s other acts both on that basis and on the bases 
set forth in Rule 403. 
